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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS IN AND FOR 
THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff and : Case No. 900172CA 
Respondent, 
vs. 
RICHARD LEE CRAWFORD, BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Defendant and 
Appellant, : 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Jurisdictional authority is conferred upon the Utah Court of 
Appeals pursuant to Section 77-35-26 and 78-2a-3(f) Utah Code 
Annotated, as amended, and for the reason that this is an appeal 
from District Court convictions of the defendant of two felonies 
of the second degree. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
I. That the State's failure to comply with discovery, and 
withholding exculpatory evidence merits a new trial. 
II. That the defendant was denied the right to cross-examine 
an important state witness, and consequently, should be granted a 
new trial. 
III. That prejudicial comments were made in the state's 
opening statement by reference to inadmissible evidence, and 
consequently, defendant is entitled to a new trial. 
IV. That the state allowed a witness to testify who was under 
the influence of drugs and/or alcohol, that this information was 
not disclosed to the jury, and consequently, the defendant is 
entitled to a new trial. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Proceedings 
The defendant was charged by criminal information with the 
second degree felony of Burglary and the second degree felony of 
Theft. Trial with a jury was had before the Honorable Ray M. 
Harding, District Court for Millard County. The defendant was 
found "guilty". Subsequent to the trial, evidence was discovered 
that a) A state's witness had testified while under the influence 
of drugs and/or alcohol, that this was known, but not disclosed to 
the jury. b) That the state had failed to disclose exculpatory 
evidence, c) that a key state witness, having exculpatory evidence 
was sent home by the state, after such exculpatory evidence was 
disclosed to the state, and the defendant was not allowed to call 
this witness or cross-examine him. d) That the state's opening 
2 
remarks contained prejudicial reference to incriminating evidence 
which was found by the trial court to be inadmissible. All of 
these matters were called to the attention of the trial court by 
way of Motions for New Trial. The Motions were denied, and the 
defendant sentenced. The convictions and sentences are now 
appealed. 
Statement of Facts 
During the evening of February 25, or in the early morning 
hours of February 26, there was a burglary and theft at the 
Paradise Inn, a motel, located in Fillmore, Millard County, Utah. 
(T.59) It was discovered that several rooms had been forcibly 
entered, (T.68) and that the television sets and controls (T.67) 
and some bedspreads had been removed. (T. 67) The testimony at the 
trial further demonstrated that the missing bedspreads were of a 
unique design and color, not generally available to the public. 
(T. 65, 66, 88, 89, 90) And that in rooms with two beds, there was 
at least one matching bedspread identical in design and color to 
the missing bedspread. (88-90) The missing television sets and 
their controls had not been located, but two bedspreads identical 
to those missing from the Paradise Inn were located, and identified 
as coming from the defendant. The first bedspread, Exhibit No. 7, 
3 
was found in possession of Steve Johnson, who reported to the 
investigating officer that he had received the bedspread from the 
defendant. (Preliminary Hearing Transcript Page 12) The other 
bedspread came from a friend of the defendant, and with whom he had 
lived for a short time. This friend was Margaritt Elena Byrge. (T. 
140) The bedspread coming through Mrs. Byrge was identified as 
Exhibit No. 11. Neither Mrs. Byrge nor Mr. Johnson appeared at 
Preliminary Hearing, but the investigating officer testified as to 
his contacts and discussions with these people. Investigation 
reports prepared by the investigating officer were furnished to the 
defendant, all consistent with the officer's hearsay testimony at 
the Preliminary Hearing. This testimony was consistent with the 
possible guilt of the defendant. After the trial, the defense team 
discovered that Steve Johnson had been subpoenaed by the State to 
appear as a witness. (R. 67 to 68) He advised the prosecution team 
that he had received his bedspread, Exhibit 7, from the defendant, 
but that the date he received it was over one year prior to the 
date of the burglary and theft charged to the defendant at the 
trial. And that upon such disclosure, the State's representatives 
directed Mr. Johnson to leave. See Affidavit of investigator, 
Roger Jorgensen (R. 175 to 178) This investigator further 
4 
O ; - , - . ' . . • . • * . ! t - w ! ' • • , • „ . .- . . . ; « . - ; f. h e 
i n f l u e n c e o : o r u y s a n o / o r a l c o h o l a t t h e r ime of t r i a l , d ' / c o u n ' i.ng 
f o r h e r pcx r r e c o l ! e c 4 i o n of ; : a t e s a n u e v e n t s a s s i ie t e s t i f i e d . 
(T . 1 4 1 , 1 . .q c o n d i t i o n was n e v e r d i s c l o s e d t o 
t l le j u r y . As t h e s t a t e o p e n e d i t .<: casr-1 and ben. i : . ,vit- o p e n i n g 
r e m a r k s , r e f e r e n c e was made t o t h e n ianner o r rrn - - P, • • / 
t h e u s p o f f n n l ? s n o b a s a p r v b a r , a n d / ^ r a l a r g e s o r t .. o : j , c i . 
<*o, ; I M ! h e r r e f e r e n c e v/as n.ade :• t h e f a r ' • na* ; - e d e f e n d a n t was 
d i s c o v e i o. —•• --• ' • - •: t 
T r i a l , • .r • -- ' i : . ^ ; / e d i i o i ' r ::'* d e f e n d a n t v \e ie ro io : t< b e 
i n a d m i s s i b l e ^ s e v i d e n c e • ^ ^ , T h e s e m a t t e r s w e r e 
] " t j t t > ' . M o t i o n s f o r New T r i a l s ' R » 
i :> i ! * J b 4 , 1 b4 : , . .« id ] * t t . >
 t • •,- f! t i u i D w e i - d e r . i e d . 
One b a s i s u i a e n i d i wets UidL m e d* r< • ) 
c r o s s - e x a m i n e S t e v e J o h n s o n a t P r e l i ; . : a
 7 n r a i , i ^ j , \r I-. t u ~;o) 
T i n s / .as C i t a c J y an < 1:101, dirt t h a 4 c i » ;i was - n r c c t e ' , • he 
Coui t l s a r t e : ' _ f ^ . >* ,
 t . f 
P r e l i m i n a r y I k a i i n ^ • ,«i i luwevei , * no ±1 >' , ; r t 
c o n t i n u e d *, :e e t r o L , -.-i-Hii ; . w e x i s t s , J I I I w h i c h fornix a p< i n t 
r ; M , r ' •. . - ."" . . % * • , - 1J1' i f" ; a n t 3 • -v 
f 1 i a J . 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Trial by which the defendant was found "guilty" was 
prejudicial to the defendant in the following respects: The 
prosecutor's opening statement contained reference to evidence 
which was very incriminating, but found to be inadmissible. A 
witness under the influence of drugs and/or intoxicants was called 
by the State without disclosure of her condition. The State failed 
to disclose exculpatory evidence, and directed their witness, Steve 
Johnson, to leave the Courthouse and not return. Thus denying the 
defendant access and use of the exculpatory testimony and right to 
cross-examine the witness. Therefore, the defendant is entitled 
to a new trial. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT 1. THE STATE'S FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH DISCOVERY, 
AND WITHHOLDING EXCULPATORY EVIDENCE MERITS A NEW TRIAL. 
At the initiation of his defense and response to the charges 
brought against him, the defendant filed with the Justice of the 
Peace, who conducted the arraignment and Preliminary Hearing, an 
appropriate Motion for Discovery. (R 1-46) That being the case, 
the State had a positive duty to disclose the exculpatory evidence 
had through Steve Johnson, which was that the defendant had given 
him one of the missing bedspreads, but this occurred over one year 
6 
p: i w t - ti . » 'jgldii ior
 Which the defendant was tried. Failure 
, . • s dnp process and warrants a new tri al. See the 
I ol *.uvJ J_r±tj o , ? iiwj • i i os : 
S t a t e v. Jar iea , , . : 2 J 8 ( U t a h 19 8 0 ) . 
The question as fo what duty a prosecutor has to dj sclose 
allegedly exculpatory evidence in a criminal case depends 
on the nature of the evidence, whefiier the defense made 
a specific request for the evidence, whether the evidence 
is perjured, whether the defense knew, or using reasonab-
le diligence, should have known, about the evidence, and, 
to a certain extent, the conduet of 111e prosecution. The 
underlying concern is, of course, to make the judicial 
process a search for truth and not just an arena of 
competition between the prosecution and the defense. 
Id. , at 223, 224. 
P r o s e c u t o r i a I s u p pre s s i o i i o f e v i d e i I c e f a v o r a fo 1 o- 11. :. h e 
accused., i n the f a c e o f a s p e c i f i c request for t h e 
evidence, violates due process if the evidence is 
material either to guilt or to punishment. Good faith 
of the prosecution in such an instance is irrelevant. 
Id. , at 2 24; Brady v. Mar yland, 3 73 I J.S. 8 3 (] 9 63) 
N o i i d i s c 1 o s u r e r e s u 11 i n g f r o rn 11 :i e f a 1 1 u r e o f t h e p o 1 i c e 
or other members of the prosecutorial team to inform the 
defense attorney of exculpatory or other relevant 
evidence may a1so resu11 in a vio1ation of due process. 
Jarre11, 608 P.2d at 224; Giglio v. United States, 405 
U.S. 150 (3 972) ; B arbee v. Warden , 3 31 F . 2 d 8 4 2 ( 41 h C i r . 
. \ b 4 ) . 
.:L is court has recognized that a de1iberate suppression 
by the prosecution of evidence whicli is material to the 
guilt or innocence of a defendant in a criminal case is 
a denial of due process. Jarrel 1, 608 P.2d at 224; State 
v. Stewart, 544 P.2d 477 (Utah 1975); Butt v. Graham, 6 
Utah 2d 133, 307 P.2d 892 (1957). But see Ward" v. 
Turner, 12 Utah 2d 310, 366 P. 2d 72 (1961); Turner v. 
Ward, 321 F.2d 918 (lOti I Cir. 1963). 
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United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 (1976). 
[I]f the subject matter of . . . a request is material, 
or indeed if a substantial basis for claiming materiality 
exists, it is reasonable to require the prosecutor to 
respond either by furnishing the information or by 
submitting the problem to the trial judge. When the 
prosecutor receives a specific and relevant request, the 
failure to make any response is seldom, if ever, ex-
cusable. Id., at 106. 
tI]f the evidence is so clearly supportive of a claim of 
innocence that it gives the prosecution notice of a duty 
to produce, that duty should equally arise even if no 
request is made. Id., at 107. 
[I]f the omitted evidence creates a reasonable doubt that 
did not otherwise exist, constitutional error has been 
committed. Id., at 112. 
This means that the omission must be evaluated in the 
context of the entire record. If there is no reasonable 
doubt about guilt whether or not the additional evidence 
is considered, there is no justification for a new trial. 
On the other hand, if the verdict is already of ques-
tionable validity, additional evidence of relatively 
minor importance might be sufficient to create a reasona-
ble doubt. Id., at 112-113. 
People v. Neiman, 197 N.E.2d 8 (111. 1964). 
The law is well settled that the prosecution is required 
to furnish on demand to the defendant for impeachment 
purposes specific statements in its possession made by 
a State's witness which have been established to exist 
and which are in the witnesses1 own words or substantial-
ly verbatim. Id. , at 10; People v. Moses, 11 111.2d 84, 
142 N.E.2d 1; People v. Wolff, 19 111.2d 318, 167 N.E.2d 
197; People v. Harrison, 25 111.2d 407, 185 N.E.2d 244, 
People v. Wright, 111. 198 N.E.2d 316. 
People v. Rosario, 9 N.Y.2d 286, 173 N.E.2d 881 (1961). 
The state has no interest in interposing any obstacle to 
the disclosure of the facts and since the defense should 
be given the benefit of any information that can legitim-
8 
a t e 1 y t e i i d t. o o v e r t h r o w t h e c a s e m a d e f o r t h e p r o s e c u -
tion, or to show that it i s unworthy of credence, People 
v. Davis, 52 Mich. 569, 572, 573-574, 18 N.W. 362, 363 
(1884); People v. Walsh, 262 N.Y. 140, 150, 186 N.E. 422, 
429 (1933), the defendant is entitled to see and use the 
entire statement. Otherwise, there is always a danger 
that something wi 11 be withheld from defense counsel 
whieh niay assist h11 i i in impeaching the prosecuti oi I ' s 
v i t- r i e s;.. R o s a r i o , ] 7 3 N . E . 2 d a t 8 83 - 8 8 4 . 
p 0 I N T 2 : THE STATE'S FAILURE TO pRODUCi . • ^-
STEVE JOHNSON, DELIBERATELY SENDING HIM A W A I t I ^fi i nii 
TRIAL, KNOWING HE HAD EXCULPATORY EVIDENCE, EFFECTIVELY 
DENIED THE DEFENDANT THE RIGHT OF CROSS-EXAMINATION, WAS 
A MATERIAL DENIAL OF DUE PROCESS AND MERITS A NEW TRIAI». 
j i . i S L ' ^ J I i i j r . d U ' U M_* [ ' U J I I L I UIMI -l o M J , • I fJ 1 •• I ^ t o a 
vc i v j . n o i t c n t a s p e c t ' f t h e ^ d U ' noi PI: (wu« -i no :!•*» w ; I n* , - « ^ v e 
iul low 'Mj o * i >: ^  t : 
S t a t e v'. H I j ju i , 7/ . ., ; - *. . [ an ' "-^(M. 
The right to cr oss-exanij M J I :-. D M -ul :.d seldom should be 
limited by the trial cout* . . . , Cross examinatioii is 
the principal means by v;^ i L :; Uio bel ievability of a 
witness and th<- t i ul ; :>f his te,-;t inu M:y is tested. Id. , 
at 205; State v. Leonard, 707 P.2d b >u\ 655 (Utah 1 ? H S ) ; 
State v. Maestas, 564 P.2d i 3 8 6, 138^ M t M; - M ~ M * I\:; j s 
v, Alaska, 415 U.S. 3 0 8, J1*; (i;"4) 
Tii^ exposure oi. ... W M , M ... ;:,. t ;Vjt; n ^ ^ s i i i ) n;., is 
a proper and important; I unction of 1 he constitutionally 
protected right of cross-examination- £LLLIi\L' /?'-7 P. 2d 
at 20 5; State v. Chesnut, 621 P . ^ 1 M M P ~ ~ I -. * . t-ah 
19 80) . " 
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State v, Leonard, 707 P.2d 650, (Utah 1985). (See supra). 
The Sixth Amendment guarantees a criminal defendant the 
right to confront and cross examine adverse witnesses. 
Id. at 655. 
There are few subjects, perhaps, upon which the Supreme 
Court and other courts have been more nearly unanimous 
than in their expressions of belief that the right of 
confrontation and cross-examination is an essential and 
fundamental requirement for the kind of fair trial which 
is this country's constitutional goal. Id. at 655-656; 
Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 405 (1965). 
The trial judge . . . has discretion to limit cross-
examination to preclude repetitive and unduly harassing 
interrogation, Davis, 415 U.W. at 316, or to preserve a 
witness1 constitutional immunity from self incrimination. 
Id. at 320. However, the scope of cross-examination as 
to credibility is and must be broad if it is to fulfill 
its designated purpose of exposing bias and purging 
testimony of intended or unintended error. Full exposure 
of a witness1 bias or prejudice is essential if a jury 
is to be able to fully assess the existence and extent 
of the witness1 bias. Leonard, 707 P.2d at 656; Stevens 
v. Bordenkircher, 746 F.2d 342, 347 (6th Cir. 1984); 
United States v. Bleckner, 601 F.2d 382, 385 (9th Cir. 
1979). 
State v. Maestas, 564 P.2d 1386 (Utah 1977). (See Supra). 
The right to cross-examine is an invaluable right 
embodied in Article I, Section 12 of the Utah Constitu-
tion and in the Sixth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution which assures the right to confrontation. 
Id. at 1387; Davis, 415 U.S. 308 (1974); Douglas v. 
Alabama, 380 U.S. 415 (1965); Evans v. State, 550 P.2d 
830 (Alaska 1976); Alford v. United States, 282 U.S. 687 
(1931) . 
People v. Manchetti, 175 P.2d 533 (Cal. 1946). 
Of course defendant cannot complain if he had opportunity 
to cross-examine and failed to exercise right. . . . But 
[where] it appeared that the witness imight throw a fit1 
. . . and that [counsel had not had sufficient time] to 
10 
familiarize hin ^  1 i u 11 1 tin tacts and background ol the 
case, [and thus the witness was excused, the com i i ] 
failure even to attempt to secure to defendant his right 
of adequate cross-examination was an abuse of discretion. 
Id. at 539. 
State x . Zolantakis, 2^9 I. 104 4 (Ut \\\ 1* / ) . 
In a judicial investigation 1 he right of cross-exam111a — 
tion is an absolute right and not a mere privilege of 
the party against whom the witness is called. If is only 
after such right ha* IMM n substantially and fawJy 
exercised that the allowance oi furtht r cross-exainina L ion 
becomes discretionary, T_d , , ^ t J 074. 
The reason for the iule is doubtless the fact that the 
cross-examination of a witness may not only modify ^nd 
explain, but it may destioy the nvid nee in chief. Id. 
Wray \ . Stat c, IV! Aid. Jt, I) oo. 68/ (1J08). 
The right to be confronted by tin witnesses against him 
imports t lie const i tut r< inal privilege t o ci oss-oxami ne i he 
opposir q witnesses ] cL at (98. 
81 Am )ur 2d Witnesses Sec. 464. 
A denial of the right of cross-examination, where that 
right has not been waived, is a constitutional error of 
the first magnitule, and nc amount oi showing of want of 
prejudice can cure it. Davis v. A1 ^ ska, 415 U.S. U)8 
(1974). But see e.g. Murray City v. Hall, 663 P.2d 1 H 4 , 
1V1 (Utah 1983) (accused's right of confrontation is not 
absolute); State v. Maestas, 564 P.2d 1386 (Utah 19/7) 
(In certain instances, it muc t vi^ld to leqitin Ho 
gcvernment a 1 interests) 
P01N1 3. JUL IROSLCU10RS OPLNING Sli 1 LMJ N I RiLiRENCI 10 
INADMISSIRL1 LVIDENCL WAS MATERIA! AND IICJUDICIAL, 
DENIED THE DEFENDANT DUE PROCESS, AND AS A LONfFQUINCL 
THE DEFENDANT IS FNTITLID TO A NFW TRIAL. 
In describing tin method of lorced enliy to the LOOI of I he 
Paradise inn, the prosecutor described ; in Ins opening remarks, the 
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type of tool most likely to be used for such purpose, and then 
indicated that the State would offer evidence that the defendant 
possessed such tools, was found in their possession at the time of 
his arrest, and that the ;jury would see these tools. When the 
State attempted to introduce this evidence, the Court considered 
the defense objection, and ruled that the evidence was inadmis-
sible. There was no effort made by the prosecutor to correct the 
inappropriate remarks, and the defendant was prejudiced thereby. 
Thus, requiring a new trial. See the following authorities: 
PREJUDICIAL EFFECT OF PROSECUTOR'S OPENING REMARKS 
CONCERNING EVIDENCE WHICH WAS INADMISSABLE. 
State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546 ;(Utah 1987). 
This court has established a test to determine whether 
a prosecutor engaged in misconduct and whether that 
misconduct constitutes reversible error. A prosecutor's 
actions and remarks constitute misconduct that merits 
reversal if the actions or remarks call to the attention 
of the jurors matters they would not be justified in 
considering in determining their verdict and . . . the 
error is substantial and prejudicial such that there is 
a reasonable likelihood that in its absence, there would 
have been a more favorable result for the defendant. Id. 
at 555; see State v. Knight, 734 P.2d 913, 919 (Utah 
1987); State v. Tucker, 727 P.2d 185, 187-88 (Utah 9186); 
State v. Banner, 717 P.2d 1325, 1335 & n. 14 (Utah 1986); 
State v. Hutchinson, 655 P.2d 635, 637 (Utah 1982); 
accord State v. Jerry Velarde, 734 P.2d 449, 456 (Utah 
1986); State v. Tarafa, 720 P.2d 1368, 1372 (Utah 1986). 
[W]hen evaluating the possible prejudice to a defendant's 
case resulting from a prosecutor's comments, this court 
assesses whether, absent the alleged prejudice, there is 
reasonable likelihood of a more favorable result for the 
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defendant. I 11 I man, 7S0 1,2(1 at r 0 1 ; See also cases 
m< ntioneti above . 
Walker v. State, fa/4 P.2d 68/ (Utah 19H1). 
fl]he State while charged with vigorously enforcing the 
laws has a dut/ to not only secure appropriate convic-
tions, but an even highei duty to see that justice is 
done. Id., at 691. see todianna v. Morris, b)4 1 .2rl 4r 
877 (Utah 1979) 
Tn hi-) ioJe as the State's representative in criminal 
n liters, the prosecutoi . . . must not only attempt to 
win cases, but must see that justice is done. Walker, 
b/,4 P.2d it 691; if Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 
i f (IMS). 
iWjliiie he should prosecute with earnestness and vi~)or, 
it is as much his du1 / to refrain irons improper methods 
calculated to produce a wrongful conviction as it is to 
u >e eveiy legitimate means to b r m j about 1 just one. 
W ilker , 624 P. 2d at C M State v. Adams, S8 I.^l tf , U 
(Utah 1978). 
[Where J the prosecution knowingly fostered [a false 
impression], . . . the . . . case con^titutted] [losecut-
orial misconduct which seiiously interfered with the 
trial court's tiuth seeking functi >n. We believe this 
to be analogous to the prosecution 1 J n o w m g use of false 
testimony and therefore subject to t lie same standard of 
materiality used in 1 hose castf . talker, 6?4 P.* I it 
691. 
State v. Gordon, 32] A.2d 3r"> (Me. 1974). 
Prosecutor's opening statement reference II a1 alleged 
accomplice had been convicted of robbery for which 
defendant was on trial wa improper conduct, but en the 
whole, prosecutor's impioper conduct did rid render 
defendant victim oi fundamentally unfair trial where 
prosecutor's iem irks were momentary and did not highlight 
alleged accomplice's conduct oi his testimony as a 
critical feature oi prosecutor's case and courl in-
c
 1 ructed that an^ statement of cout oL were not evid nc -
t . I d . , a 1 i 6 ° - 5 6 S . 
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We note also that Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731 (1969) 
intimates strongly that if a prosecutor who is describing 
to the jury the substance of testimony which he expects 
to elicit from a purported accomplice whom he will call 
as a prosecution witness mentions the existence of an 
extra-judicial confession of the accomplice, the prosecu-
tor may be acting in violation of defendant's constitu-
tional right of confrontation. For this reason, a 
prosecutor is well advised to confine himself to a 
summary of the testimony which the purported accomplice 
is expected to give on the witness stand and to avoid any 
reference to the existence of an extra-judicial confes-
sion by the alleged accomplice or any mention that the 
anticipated testimony is already contained, in substance, 
in such a confession. Gordon, 321 A.2d 363 n. 8. 
State v. Fenton, 499 S.W.2d 813 (Mo. 1973). 
As a general rule the opening statement should be brief 
and general, rather than detailed, and should be confined 
to statements based on facts which can be proved and 
should not include facts which are plainly inadmissible. 
This rule is consistent with the duty that a prosecuting 
attorney charged with to see that a person on trial is 
afforded a fair trial. _ld. , at 815. 
We are of the opinion that in this case the prosecuting 
attorney's disclosure during his opening statement to the 
jury . . . injected the venom of prejudice into the 
defendant's right to a fair and impartial trial and, 
under the circumstances, the only antidote available was 
for the trial court to declare a mistrial. Id. , at 816. 
These statements made by the district attorney in his 
opening to the jury . . . very naturally took serious, 
and, perhaps, permanent lodgment in the minds of the 
jury. They went far beyond the rights possessed by 
government counsel in outlining its case to the jury; 
contained statements wholly incompetent, were seriously 
prejudicial to defendant's case, and should not have been 
admitted. Idk ; Quig v. United States, 33 F.2d 820 (3rd 
Cir. 1929); State v. Peters, 107 A.2d 428, 431 (R.I. 
1954) . 
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We are also reminded by Sherwood, J. in State v. Jackson, 
95 Mo. 623, 653, 8 S.W. 749, 762 (1888), in considering 
the ability of a jury to disregard an improper opening 
statement remark, that all those who have ever engaged 
in active practice know how difficult is for the court, 
by some such simple reprimand, to eradicate from the 
memories of jurors the evil of such illegitimate state-
ments. Like the tares mentioned in Holy Writ, which the 
enemy sowed while men slept, they become as ineradicable 
as the good wheat of legitimate testimony among which 
their mischief-bearing seeds are case. Fenton, 499 
S.W.2d at 816-817. 
State v. Peters, 107 A,2d 428 (1954). 
When improper and extraneous matter of a harmful nature 
is intentionally injected or accidentally creeps into the 
evidence, it is the duty of the trial justice, upon 
complaint being made, to free the evidence from such 
matter, if possible, with proper warning to the jury. 
On the other hand, if this is not reasonably possible, 
then he ought to pass the case. Ui. , at 430-431; Lavigne 
v. Ballantyne, 66 R.I. 123, 126, 17 A.2d 845, 846 (1941). 
In a criminal case the prosecuting attorney is in effect 
the representing of the people and not an advocate in the 
ordinary meaning of that term . . . He represents all the 
people of the commonwealth, including the defendant. 
Peters, 107 A.2d at 431; Goff v. Commonwealth, 241 Ky. 
428, 431, 44 S.W. 2d 306, 308 (1931). 
In a criminal prosecution the attorney for the government 
was the representative of a sovereignty whose obligation 
was to govern impartially and that the interest of such 
officer was not that the sovereign "shall win a case, but 
that justice shall be done." Peters, 107 A.2d at 431; 
Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1934). 
State v. Thomas, 244 P.2d 653 (Utah 1952). 
While District Attorney is obligated to prosecute persons 
brought to trial with vigor and earnestness, he owes 
defendant duty to be fair in conduct of trial. _Id. , at 
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656; State v. Murphy, 92 Utah 382, 383, 68 P.2d 188 
(19_) • 
A prosecutor is in a peculiar and very definite sense the 
servant of the law, the twofold aim of which is that 
guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer. He may 
prosecute with earnestness and vigor. But, while he may 
strike hard blows, he is not at liberty to strike foul 
ones. It is as much his duty to refrain from improper 
methods calculated to produce a wrongful conviction as 
it is to use every legitimate means to bring about a just 
one. Thomas, 244 P.2d at 656; Berger v. United States, 
295 U.S. 78, 88 (1934) . 
Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78 (1934). (See infra). 
It is fair to say that the average jury, in a greater or 
less degree, has confidence that these obligations which 
so plainly rest upon the prosecuting attorney, will be 
faithfully observed. Consequently, improper suggestions, 
insinuations and, especially assertions of personal 
knowledge are apt to carry much weight against the 
accused when they should properly carry none. Jjd. , at 
88. 
POINT 4. ALLOWING A WITNESS TO TESTIFY WHO IS UNDER THE INFLUENCE 
OF ALCOHOL AND OR DRUGS, WITHOUT DISCLOSING THIS CONDITION TO THE 
JURY, CONSTITUTES REVERSIBLE ERROR, AND THE DEFENDANT IS ENTITLED 
TO A NEW TRIAL. 
The State called as a witness Margaritt Elena Byrge. Her 
testimony was important regarding the bed spread in her possession, 
being placed in her possession by the defendant, and the date she 
received the same. Also her testimony was important was to 
identifying the defendants shoes. These shoes being among those 
which possibly made foot prints at the burglary scene. (T 116, 
162, 181-184, 189-192). Mrs. Byrge was confused as to the dates 
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and other material matters. (T. 137, 141, 142, 144, 145). The 
jury may have been in a much better position to consider the weight 
to be given to her testimony had they known her condition. Failure 
to disclose her condition denies the jury important facts within 
their duty to perform, the absence of which has materially effected 
this case and merits the granting of a new trial. See the 
following authorities: 
State v. Fulton, 742 P.2d 1208 (Utah 1987). 
Under Utah Rule of Evidence 403, a court may exclude the 
testimony of any witness if the testimony's "probative 
value is substantially out weighted by the danger of 
unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading 
the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of 
time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence." 
Id., at 1218. 
Utah Rules of Evidence / Rule 601 (a). 
Every person is competent to be a witness except as 
otherwise provided in these rules. (This rule embodies 
in simpler terms, the substance of Rules 7 and 17, Utah 
Rules of Evidence (1971). 
Rule 602 
A witness may not testify to a matter unless evidence is 
introduced sufficient to support a finding that he has 
personal knowledge of the matter. 
Rule 603 
Before testifying, every witness shall be required to 
declare that he will testify truthfully, by oath or 
affirmation administered in a form calculated to awaken 
his conscience and impress his mind with his duty to do 
so. 
State v. Hubbard, 601 P.2d 929 (Utah 1979). 
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Rule 17 of the Utah Rules of Evidence [1971] (now 
embodied in Rule 601) states:] a person is disqualified 
to be a witness of the Judge finds that . . . (b) the 
proposed witness is incapable of understanding the duty 
of a witness to tell the truth. JUi. , at 930. 
The use of narcotics, do not necessarily disqualify a 
personal from being a witnessf by [is a matter] which, 
in appropriate circumstances, may be shown as bearing 
upon the credibility of the witness. ^d*' State v. 
Scott, 22 Utah 2d 27, 447 P.2d 908 (1968). 
State v. Fong Loon, 29 Idaho 248, 158 P. (1916). 
There is certainly great force in the argument that, 
where a man's liberty or his life depends upon the 
testimony of another, it is of infinite importance that 
those who are to decide upon the testimony should know, 
to the greatest extent, how far the witness is to be 
trusted. _Id. , at 235-236. 
Whatever, therefore, may materially assist them in this 
inquiry is most essential to the investigation of truth; 
and it cannot but be material for the jury to understand 
the character of the witness whom they are called upon 
the believe, and to know whether [he has] rendered 
himself less credible by his disgraceful conduct. Id., 
at 236. 
The capacity of a witness to observe and to receive 
accurate impressions, to retain them in his memory, and 
to correctly relate them, also how power and inclination 
to be truthful, are all subjects which go to the credibi-
lity of a witness. And we think it was error for the 
court to restrict the cross-examination of this witness 
and prevent the elicitation of the above facts. ld_. , at 
237. 
Any diseased impairment of the testimonial powers, 
arising from whatever source, ought also to be con-
sidered. Id. 
Excessive use of opium may always be always shown as 
tending to impair the credibility of a witness, but it 
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is not ground for the exclusion of his testimony until 
it satisfactorily appears that he was under its influence 
when examined. Id. 
Hartford v. Palmer, 16 Johnson's Reports 143 (N.Y. 1819). 
This principle [that a witness must be fully possessed 
of his understanding and be able to remember the events 
of which he is testifying] necessarily excludes persons 
from testifying who are besotted with intoxication at the 
time they are offered as witnesses. 
It is a temporary derangement of the mind; and it is 
impossible for such men to have such a memory of events, 
of which they may have had a knowledge, as to be able to 
present them fairly and faithfully, to those who are to 
decide upon contested facts. Id. 
A present and existing intoxication, to a considerable 
degree, utterly disqualifies the person so affected to 
narrate facts and events in a way at all to be relied on. 
li-
lt would . . . be profaning the sanctity of an oath to 
tender it to a man who had no present sense of the 
obligations it imposed. Indeed it would be a scandal to 
the administration of justice to allow, for a moment, the 
rights of individuals to be jeopardized by the testimony 
of any man laboring under the beastly sin of drunkenness. 
Ld. 
CONCLUSION 
The defendant is entitled to a new trial, and the appellate 
court should so order. Four errors have been pointed out, which 
considered, in some respects, by themselves would demonstrate the 
failure to afford the defendant due process, but which, when 
combined can only lead to the conclusion that the defendant was 
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denied due process at his trial, and the appropriate remedy is to 
grant him a new trial. 
Respectfully submitted this 14th day of September, 1990. 
^/^j^^fc^ 
MILTON T. HARMON 
Attorney for the 
Defendant and Appellant 
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LeRAY G. JACKSON 
Attorney tor the DP tend ant 
2 97 North Highway 6, 545 
Delta, Utah 846?4 
Telephone: (801) 8 64-2716 
MILTON T. HARMON #1373 
Attorney tor the Defendant 
36 South fla i n Street 
P.O. i3ox 9 7 
Nepnl, Utah 84643 
Telephone: (801) 623-1802 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN MJ U FOR 
MILLARD COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
P1 a i n t i t t , 
vs 
RICHARD LEE C R A W F O R D , 
D e f e n d a n t 
MOTION FOR NEU TRIAL 
Case No . 
, Judge 
Comes now the d e f e n d a n t and moves the above entitled Court 
tor a new trial. Said Motion is made tor the following r e a s o n s : 
1. Ihe defendant was unable to bp cully prepared tor trial 
tor the reason that the S r a f e tailed to fully respond to the °rder 
01 D i s c o v e r y , and such c i r c u m s t a n c e s were not apparent until 
testimony was ottered at trial. Such In formation is as follows: 
hOr ION FOR NI«„W 1R1AL Pa^e 2 
A. No reports were turnlshed regarding the investigation ot 
the Millard County Sheriff's O t M c e in the Carbon and Emery County 
a r e a s . 
ii. No reports regarding the use ot "The Crime Solver" r . V , 
broadcast s. 
C . No reports cere turnished regarding the Investigatory 
activities ot the Sherltt's Ottice tor Grand, Emery, r a r b o n , K a n e , 
S e v i e r , iron, B e a v e r , and Washington C o u n t i e s , when all such 
ottice s were involved in the i n v e s t i g a t i o n . 
2 . The States w i t n e s s , M r s . B u r g e s , testified while under the 
influence or d r u g s . And in a d d i t i o n , may have been threatened with 
criminal prosecution it she tailed to testify tor tne S t a t e , thus 
c o m p r o m i s i n g the reliability ot her testimony. 
3. The State displayed inadmissible evidence in front ot tne 
jury. An inadmissible bedspread, similar to those s t o l e n , was 
displayed to the jury. 
4. Cross examination ot the S t a t e d fingerprint expert was 
iimLten, with the defense not being allowed to sufficiently 
explore tne conflict in testimony between the State's witnesses 
reparding tingerurint identification ot th° d e f e n d a n t . 
MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL Page 3 
5. The detense was prevented trom admitting a witness to 
testify on the question ot sources of shoes similar to those ot 
tne d e f e n d a n t , which were offered Into e v i d e n c e . 
The above matters developed during the course ot the t r i a l , 
and as a c o n s e q u e n c e , the defendant should be granted a new trial 
with sufficient time to properly develop his defenses based upon 
evidence disclosed at the trial w h i c h , under detenses based upon 
evidence disclosed at the trial, w h i c h , under the Order Ot 
D i s c o v e r y , was not previously d i s c l o s e d . T h e r e b y , limiting the 
d e f e n d a n t ' s ability to be properly prepared at the time ot the 
trial. 
In the event the plaintiff opposes this M o t i o n , or denies the 
a l l e g a t i o n s made h e r e i n , defendant requests that the Court set a 
date tor a hearing upon this (lotion, tor the taking of oral 
testimony thereon. 
Respecttuliy submitted this 4th day ot J a n u a r y , 1939. 
MILTON T. HARMON 
Attorney tor the Defendant 
LeRAY G. JACKSON 
Attorney tor the Defendant 
MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL Page 4 
C E R T I F I C A T E OF D F f., I VF, f? Y 
i hereby certlty that I delivered a true and correct: copy oc 
the foregoing (lotion For New Trial to: fir. D e x t e r I,. A n d e r s o n , 
Millard County Deputy A t t o r n e y , this 4th day ot J a n u a r y , 198 9. 
MILTON T. HARMON #1373 
Attorney for the Defendant 
36 South Main Street 
P.O. Box 97 
Nephi , Utah 84648 
Telephone: (801) 623-1802 
IN THE JUSTICE'S COURT IN AND FOR EAST MILLARD PRECINCT, 
MILLARD COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
RICHARD LEE CRAWFORD, 
Defendant. 
Criminal No. 88-1124 
MOTION FOR DISCOVERY 
Ronald R. Hare, Judge 
Comes now the Defendant, by and through his legal counsel, 
MILTON T. HARMON, and pursuant to Rule 16 of the Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure, and requests that the Plaintiff furnish the 
following information had by the State and pertinent to the 
above-entitled action: 
1. Relevant written or recorded statements of the Defendant. 
2. The criminal record of the Defendant. 
3. Description of any physical evidence seized from the 
Defendant. 
4. Any evidence known to the prosecutor that tends to negate 
the guilt of the Defendant or mitigate the degree of the offense. 
MOTION FOR DISCOVERY Page 2 
5. Any written or recorded statements made by the complaining 
wi t n e s s . 
6. The Defendant further requests all written and recorded 
r e p o r t s , s t a t e m e n t s , investigation r e p o r t s , field n o t e s , and any 
other d o c u m e n t a t i o n including p h o t o g r a p h s , scientific analysis 
r e p o r t s , and tape recordings pertaining to the instant charges 
prepared by the investigating o f f i c e r , the complaining w i t n e s s , or 
any parties connected with the State's presentation of the case. 
7. The Defendant requests a copy of the formal charging 
document prepared for these p r o c e e d i n g s . 
DATED this day of June, 1 9 8 8 . 
MILTON T. HARMON 
Attorney for the Defendant 
C E R T I F I C A T E 0£ MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Motion for Discovery to: Mr. Dexter L. A n d e r s o n , Millard 
County Deputy A t t o r n e y , S.R. Box 5 2 , F i l l m o r e , UT 84631 and Mr. 
Richard Lee C r a w f o r d , c/o Millard County S h e r i f f , S.R. Box 5 0 , 
F i l l m o r e , UT 8 4 6 3 1 ; first-class postage prepaid, this day 
of June, 1988. 
MILTON T. HARMON #1373 
Attorney for the Defendant 
36 South Main Street 
P.O. Box 97 
Nephi, Utah 84648 
Telephone: (801) 623-1802 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
MILLARD COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : REQUEST FOR REVIEW OF 
PENDING MOTIONS 
Plaintiff, : 
vs. : Case No. 
RICHARD LEE CRAWFORD, : 
Defendant. : Judge 
Conies now the Defendant, by and through his counsel of record, 
MILTON T. HARMON and LeRAY G. JACKSON, and moves the above-entitled 
Court to review the Motions now pending before the Court as the 
Court convenes in Millard County on the 26th day of April, 1989. 
Respectfully submitted this day of April, 1989. 
MILTON T. HARMON 
Attorney for the Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Request for Review of Pending Motions to: Mr. Dexter L. 
Anderson, Millard County Deputy Attorney, S. R. Box 52, Fillmore, 
UT 84631, Mr. LeRay G. Jackson, Attorney at Law, 297 North Highway 
6, 545, Delta, UT 84624, and Mr. Richard Lee Crawford, P. 0. Box 
250, Draper, UT 84020; first-class postage prepaid, this 
day of April, 1989. 
it.()k)iQ* A o / v . / * S f t ? / / v<> 
MILTON T. HARMON #1373 
Attorney for the Defendant 
36 South Main Street 
P.O. Box 9 7 
Nephi, Utah 84648 
Telephone: (801) 6 23-1802 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
MILLARD COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Case No. 1090 
Plaintiff, : 
vs. : DEFENDANT'S FURTHER REQUEST 
FOR NEW TRIAL 
RICHARD LEE CRAWFORD, : 
Defendant. : Judge 
Comes now the Defendant, and in addition to all of the 
materials heretofore furnished to the Court, makes a further 
request for new Trial on the grounds and for the reason that in 
the opening statement made by the State of Utah, the prosecuting 
attorney indicated that a part of the evidence that would be 
produced and to the Jury, would be materials that were taken from 
Mr. CRAWFORD'S van which included a set of six or eight screwdrive-
rs. (See page 53 of transcript of the Trial.) Specific mention was 
made of these tools, noting that there were no other tools found 
in the vehicle such as other tools which might have been expected 
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to be in the vehicle, and then he referred to door jambs which 
were taken from the Paradise Inn Motel in Fillmore and related 
directly to the inquiries and questions before the Court. Mr. 
Anderson then referred to the door jambs and screwdrivers, saying 
that it appeared that a large screwdriver was used to break into 
the rooms, and that the jury could make the comparison between the 
door jambs and the tools. 
As the Trial progressed, the Plaintiff attempted to introduce 
this evidence, and it appeared that the evidence was inadmissable. 
Since the prosecution referred to inadmissable evidence in its 
opening statement, it appears that there is no way that the Jury 
could separate that from the evidence that was produced in Court. 
That was among the items that was given to them and may have formed 
a basis for the verdict that was rendered. 
Consequently, the Court should grant a new Trial. 
Respectfully submitted this day of April, 1989. 
MILTON T. HARMON 
Attorney for the Defendant 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Defendant's Further Request for New Trial to: Mr. Dexter 
L. Anderson, Millard County Deputy Attorney, S. R. Box 52, 
Fillmore, UT 84631, Mr. LeRay G. Jackson, Attorney at Law, P.O. 
Box 545, Delta, UT 84624, Mr. Richard Lee Crawford, P. 0. Box 250, 
Draper, UT 84020; first-class postage prepaid, this day 
of April, 1989. 
